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Abstract— We propose a decentralized solution for a pursuit-
evasion game involving a heterogeneous group of rational
(selfish) pursuers and a single evader based on the framework
of potential games. In the proposed game, the evader aims to
delay (or, if possible, avoid) capture by any of the pursuers
whereas each pursuer tries to capture the latter only if this
is to his best interest. Our approach resembles in principle
the so-called relay pursuit strategy introduced in [1], in which
only the pursuer that can capture the evader faster than the
others is active. In sharp contrast with the latter approach, the
active pursuer herein is not determined by a reactive ad-hoc
rule but from the solution of a corresponding potential game.
We assume that each pursuer has different capabilities and
his decision whether to go after the evader or not is based on
the maximization of his individual utility (conditional on the
choices and actions of the other pursuers). The pursuers utilities
depend on both the rewards that they will receive by capturing
the evader and the time of capture (cost of capturing the evader)
so that a pursuer should only seek capture when the incurred
cost is relatively small. The determination of the active pursuer-
evader assignments (in other words, which pursuers should
be active) is done iteratively by having the pursuers exchange
information and updating their own actions by executing a
learning algorithm for games known as Spatial Adaptive Play
(SAP). We illustrate the performance of our algorithm by means
of extensive numerical simulations.
I. INTRODUCTION
Pursuit-evasion games (PEGs) with multiple players (also
known as group pursuit-evasion games) are receiving a lot
of attention at present due to their relevance to applications
involving decision makers with possibly conflicting objec-
tives. In a typical multi-player PEGs, there is a group of
pursuers playing an adversarial game against another team
of agents, which we refer to as the evaders. The goal of the
pursuers is to capture the evaders whereas the goal of the
evaders is to avoid the capture as long as possible. While
many papers have focused on finding reactive rules at the
kinematic level that will allow agents to win a game for
different problem settings, very little has been said about
pursuit-evasion games based on a strategic perspective. In
this paper, we present a game-theoretic solution to a special
class of PEGs involving multiple pursuers and a single
evader. By utilizing the framework of potential games, we
show that a meaningful pursuit strategy can naturally emerge
as a commonly accepted solution among the pursuers from
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the same team despite the fact that each pursuer acts selfishly
(cooperation emerges from selfish actions).
Literature review: PEGs have been widely studied in
various fields, such as defense [2], [3], space [4], and
robotics [5]. PEGs can be categorized into a few different
classes depending on the number of pursuers and evaders
participating in the game. In multiple-pursuers single-evader
games, for example, some form of cooperation between
pursuers is required to capture the evader [6]. In single-
pursuer multiple-evaders or multiple-pursuers multiple-
evaders games, on the other hand, the pursuer(s) often face an
assignment problem [7] or an optimization problem seeking
to minimize the costs incurred by the pursuers during the
pursuit phase [8] for assigning themselves to a set of evaders.
The numbers of players aside, there could also be scenarios
in which the players have restricted sensing abilities, which
would require advanced pursuit strategies [9]. For a broader
and more thorough review on recent studies on PEGs, one
can refer to [10].
A particular class of PEGs, which is also the main focus of
this paper, is one involving a group of pursuers and a single
evader [1], [11], [12]. In such games, although utilizing
multiple pursuers to capture the evader is possible, one can
instead employ a practical and easy to implement strategy
which is known as relay pursuit [1]. In the latter strategy,
only one pursuer goes after the evader (active pursuer) while
the rest remain still. The assignment of the evader to one
of the pursuers is determined by a simple rule according to
which the active pursuer at each instant of time is the one
that can capture the evader faster than the other pursuers.
In [1], for instance, the active pursuer is assigned by a
decentralized (or distributed) algorithm based on dynamic
Voronoi diagrams.
A significant portion of the relevant literature has put a
lot of emphasis on geometric solution approaches to PEGs
including methods based on, for instance, the Apollonius
circle [13], partitions of the boundaries of convex or non-
convex objects for border or perimeter defense [14], [15],
and Voronoi diagrams [1], [6], [7], to name but a few.
Other approaches rely on combination of optimal control and
differential games and numerical techniques for the solution
of the Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs equation and / or variational
inequality [16], [17]. The majority of the aforementioned
approaches give rise to pursuer-evader assignments which
are heavily dependent upon the geometry of the configu-
rations of the players and / or their dynamic properties.
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Such approaches ignore, however, the strategic element of
PEGs given that they require that each agent adopts a
strategy which is based on specific (fixed) rules which do
not necessarily account for their own individual interests.
In this work, we adopt a different approach to multi-player
PEGs according to which each player is an autonomous,
rational (or selfish) agent who seeks to maximize his own
assigned utility function. There have been attempts to tackle
a similar problem using a matrix game approach [18], [19],
yet the pursuer-evader assignment therein is processed in a
centralized manner in contrast with our approach which is
decentralized.
Contributions: In this paper, we address a class of PEGs
with multiple pursuers and a single evader by utilizing the
framework of potential games. Potential games, which is a
special class of non-cooperative games, are guaranteed to
admit at least one pure Nash equilibrium. Their defining
property is the existence of a potential function which is
such that an increase in the (individual) utility of an agent
implies an increase in the team’s utility. Nash equilibria
of potential games can be computed by means of iterative
decentralized or even distributed learning algorithms for
games [20]. Some characteristic examples of such algorithms
include fictitious play (FP) [21], regret matching (RM) [20],
and spatial adaptive play (SAP) [22].
In our work, the individual utility function of every pursuer
is defined in accordance with the Wonderful Life Utility [23]
which guarantees that the resulting game is a potential game.
The team of pursuers will employ the SAP algorithm to
compute a pursuer-target assignment profile that corresponds
to a pure Nash equilibrium of the corresponding potential
game. It turns out that selfish individual actions by the
pursuers at each instant of time will eventually lead to a
situation in which only one pursuer is active and the others
inactive, which is precisely the key idea of the relay pursuit
strategy proposed in [1]. We claim that this paper provides
a game-theoretic justification of the relay pursuit strategy as
well as a way to implement the latter in a decentralized way.
Note that the active pursuer or pursuers as determined by
our game-theoretic approach do not necessarily match the
active pursuer determined by the ad-hoc geometric approach
proposed in [1].
Outline: The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In
Section II, we formulate the group pursuit-evasion problem.
In Section III, we analyze the PEG using the framework of
potential games. In Section IV, we present and discuss the
results of numerical simulations. In Section V, we provide
concluding remarks and directions for future research.
II. FORMULATION OF PURSUIT-EVASION GAME
A. Notations
Given a vector ξ ∈ Rn, we denote by ‖ξ‖ its Euclidean
norm. Let us then denote by B(ξ) the (closed) ball of radius
 > 0 centered at ξ, that is, B(ξ) := {x ∈ Rn : ‖x− ξ‖ ≤
}. We also denote by S(ξ) the sphere of radius  > 0
centered at point ξ, that is, S(ξ) := {x ∈ Rn : ‖x− ξ‖ =
}. Lastly, [a, b]d denotes the discrete interval from integer a
to integer b where a ≤ b, that is, [a, b]d := {a, a+ 1, . . . , b}.
B. Problem Setup
We consider a class of pursuit-evasion games involving
N pursuers and one evader, all of which are moving in the
unbounded 2D plane. We assume that there are no obstacles
which hinder the movement of the players. The pursuers
will obtain a relevant reward if they successfully capture the
evader in time, whereas the evader will continuously strive
to avoid or delay the capture. Furthermore, we assume that
all players will either move with a constant speed or not
move at all. We also assume that all players have a limitless
sensing range, meaning that there is no range restriction; the
pursuers always know the location of the evader, and vice
versa. However, it is worth mentioning here that the previous
assumption can be relaxed given that the learning algorithm
we will use later on admits a range-constrained (and thus
distributed) implementation (we will not discuss the latter in
this paper).
The group of pursuers, which is denoted as P :=
{P1, . . . ,PN}, is assumed to be heterogeneous in the sense
that each pursuer has a maximum speed vi, which may differ
from one another, for i ∈ IP := [1, N ]d where IP is the
index-set of the group of pursuers P . We will denote by
Pi ∈ P the ith pursuer, and by E the (single) evader whose
maximum speed is denoted as ve. Furthermore, we denote
by xi ∈ R2 (respectively, x0i ∈ R2) the position of Pi at
time t ≥ 0 (respectively, t = 0), where i ∈ [1, N ]d, and by
xe ∈ R2 (respectively, x0e ∈ R2) the position of E at time
t ≥ 0 (respectively, t = 0). We assume that there is an upper
bound tf on the duration of the game beyond which the
pursuers lose the game if the evader has not been captured.
Capture of E by Pi occurs if there is a time instant t ≤ tf at
which the latter enters the capture zone of the former, that is,
xi ∈ B(xe) for a given capture radius  > 0. The capture
time of E by Pi corresponds to the smallest time t ≤ tf at
which capture occurs.
C. Player Dynamics
We will assume that all players have single integrator
dynamics, that is,
x˙i(t) = viui(t), xi(0) = x
0
i , i ∈ [1, N ]d, (1)
x˙e(t) = veue(t), xe(0) = x
0
e, (2)
where ui ∈ U (respectively, ue ∈ U) denotes the control
input of Pi (respectively, E) at time t, where U := S1(0) ∪
{0} is the (common) input value set of the players. Note
that when ui ∈ S1(0) (resp., ue ∈ S1(0)) then the input
corresponds to the direction of motion of Pi (resp., E)
whereas when ui = 0 (resp., ue = 0) then Pi (resp., E)
does not move.
D. Pure-Pursuit and Pure-Evasion Strategies
Because the focus of this paper is on the high-level
pursuer-evader assignment problem under the assumption
that each pursuer is rational, we will prescribe the low-level
pursuit and evading strategies. In particular, we will assume
that the active pursuers chase the evader by adopting the
so-called pure-pursuit strategy, that is,
ui = ξi/‖ξi‖, (3)
where ξi := xe−xi is the relative position vector of E with
respect to Pi under the assumption that E views the latter
pursuer as the closest pursuer.
The evader, on the other hand, seeks to delay or avoid,
if possible, his capture by any of the pursuers. To this aim,
we assume that E plays a pure evasion strategy against the
kth pursuer Pk where k ∈ IP corresponds to the index
of the pursuer who is the closest to E and irrespective of
whether this pursuer is an active pursuer or not (the pursuers’
assignments may not even be known to the evader). The pure
evasion strategy is defined as follows:
ue = ξk/‖ξk‖, (4)
where ξk = xe−xk. Note that, when i = k, we get ue = ui,
where ui is defined in (3) and ue in (4), which means that
the pursuer from which the evader tries to flee is the one
who is currently chasing him.
E. Time-of-Capture
Under the assumption that each active pursuer employs the
pure-pursuit strategy given in (3) whereas the evader employs
the pure-evasion strategy given in (4), we can compute (an
estimate) of the time it will take for Pi to capture E , or
the time of capture denoted by φ(xej ,xi), by solving the
following quadratic equation [19]:
(v2ej − v2i )φ2 + 2(〈ξij , vejuej 〉 − vi)φ+ ‖ξij‖2 = 2, (5)
where the evader’s (expected) control input ue (velocity) is
obtained from (4) assuming E recognizes Pi as the closest
pursuer and attempts to avoid from him. Note that we are
using the term “expected” here for the following reason; if
it turns out that Pi is not the closest pursuer to the evader
(meaning that the underlying assumption about Pi being the
active pursuer is wrong), then E will have a different control
input. In such cases, the solution φ to Equation (5) will not
correspond to the actual time of capture, but rather an upper
bound of the latter.
III. GAME THEORETIC APPROACH
A. Pursuer-Evader Assignment Problem
In this section, we will formulate the problem of selecting
the active pursuer (pursuer-evader assignment problem) and
show that the latter problem can be placed under the um-
brella of potential games [24], which is a subclass of non-
cooperative games. The pursuer-evader assignment problem
is, in a nutshell, an optimization problem in which a group of
pursuers assign themselves to a group of evaders (a single
evader in our case) in a way that their individual utilities
can be maximized. Unlike conventional target assignment
problems, however, there is one more goal for the pursuers
to achieve; that is, they must also aim to minimize the total
cost incurred during the process of pursuing the evader(s).
The latter objective will be a tacit one given that it is difficult
to guarantee an “efficient” solution to a game (e.g., efficient
Nash equilibrium), especially when one is interesting in
computing such a solution by means of a decentralized
learning algorithm as we propose to do herein. In this section,
we present a way to convert the multiple-evaders single-
evader PEG discussed in Section II as a pursuer-evader
assignment problem by formulating the PEG as a potential
game.
B. Non-cooperative Games and Potential Games
We will briefly review some basic concepts from non-
cooperative games and potential games. To this aim, let us
denote by Ai the set of available actions of the ith pursuer
Pi, and by A the set of joint actions of the group of pursuers
P , where
A = A1 × · · · ×AN .
We also denote by UPi : A → R the utility function of Pi;
note that UPi is a function of the actions of all the pursuers
and not just Pi. We denote by ai the action of Pi; if ai = E ,
then Pi is the active pursuer which is assigned to the task
of capturing E . If, on the other hand, ai = ∅ then Pi is
inactive and will stay in the same position (and thus, he
will not pursue the evader). Note that we often refer to a as
(ai, a−i) where ai is the assignment of Pi and a−i represents
the joint action profile of the rest of the pursuers. The joint
assignment profile of the whole group of pursuers is denoted
as a. Given a non-cooperative game, a joint action profile
a? is a Nash equilibrium, when there is no unilateral motive
for each pursuer to choose a different action (assignment)
if the other pursuers are committed to their current actions
(assignments), that is, ∀i ∈ [1, N ]d, it holds true that
UPi(a
?
i , a
?
−i)− UPi(ai, a?−i) ≥ 0, ∀ai ∈ Ai. (6)
The distinguishing feature of potential games is the ex-
istence of a potential function Φ : A → R such that
∀i ∈ [1, N ]d it holds true that
UPi(ai, a−i)− UPi(a′i, a−i) =
Φ(ai, a−i)− Φ(a′i, a−i), ∀ai ∈ Ai. (7)
Equation 7 implies that the difference in the pursuer’s utility
caused by a change on his own action leads to the same
change on the potential function. The existence of a pure
Nash equilibrium is guaranteed in potential games. More
importantly, one such equilibrium can be computed by means
of iterative algorithms known as learning algorithms for
games. This is a key property of potential games, which we
will leverage in our proposed solution.
C. Utility Design
We will now define the utilities of the players in such a
way that the PEG can be associated with a potential game.
An implicit requirement here is that when a pursuer cannot
capture the evader within the allotted time, then the former
receives negative rewards in case he attempts to capture the
latter (his efforts will be in vain).
Time-dependent Capture Reward: We will start by defining
the nominal reward function for capturing the evader as
follows:
rE(t) := tf − t. (8)
We note that rE(t) is an affine function of time t that takes
negative values for t > tf . This choice is meant to discourage
the pursuers from chasing the evader beyond the final time
tf (if they decide to continue chasing him, they will receive
no reward). Note that at t0 (when t = 0), rE(t0) = tf .
Total Time of Capture: We define the total time of capture
to be the sum of the time of capture of the evader by every
pursuer who is currently assigned to E . The total time of
capture can be expressed as:
TE(a;x0e,x
0
i , t0) :=
∑
i∈I?(a;t0)
φ(x0e,x
0
i ), (9)
where I?(a; t) denotes the index-set of the active pursuers,
that is, the pursuers assigned to capture the evader E , at time
t.
Total Capture Utility: The capture utility (this is the utility
associated to the task of capturing the evader), which is
denoted as UE(a;x0, t), is defined to be the difference
between the nominal reward and average time of capture,
that is,
UE(a;x0e,x
0
i , t0) := rE(t0)−
TE(a;x0e,x
0
i , t0)
|I?(a; t0)| (10)
where |·| denotes the cardinality of a set. We observe that the
utility can be negative if the average time of capture is larger
than the nominal reward. This is, again, to encourage the
pursuers to remain at the same position rather than following
an evaders that they cannot capture in time.
Pursuer Utility: There are many ways to design the pursuer’s
individual utility function. In particular, we will use the won-
derful life utility (WLU) [20], [23]. The WLU corresponds
to the marginal contribution made by the pursuer to the total
capture utility, i.e.,
UPi(a;x
0
e,x
0
i , t0) = UE((ai, a−i);x
0
e,x
0
i , t0)
− UE((ai = ∅, a−i);x0e,x0i , t0). (11)
Problem 1 (Pursuer-Evader Assignment Problem): Let
us define the initial game of the pursuit-evasion game
formulated in Section II as the following:
G0 := 〈P, {Ai, UPi(a;x0e,x0i , t0)}i∈IP 〉.
Then, find a pursuer-evader assignment profile, a? ∈ A, such
that ∀i ∈ IP , the following condition holds true:
UPi((a
?
i , a
?
−i);x
0
e,x
0
i , t0) ≥ UPi((ai, a?−i);x0e,x0i , t0)
∀ai ∈ Ai, which corresponds to a pure Nash equilibrium of
the game G0.
Finally, the WLU guarantees the existence of a potential
function [23], which, in our case, turns out to be the total
capture utility UE . In particular, by setting Φ = UE we get:
UPi((a
′
i, a−i);x
0
e,x
0
i , t0)− UPi((ai, a−i);x0e,x0i , t0)
=
(
UE((a′i, a−i);x
0
e,x
0
i , t0)− UE((∅, a−i);x0e,x0i , t0)
)
− (UE((ai, a−i);x0e,x0i , t0)− UE((∅, a−i);x0e,x0i , t0))
= UE((a′i, a−i);x
0
e,x
0
i , t0)− UE((ai, a−i);x0e,x0i , t0),
from which we conclude that
UPi((a
′
i, a−i);x
0
e,x
0
i , t)− UPi((ai, a−i);x0e,x0i , t)
= Φ((a′i, a−i);x
0
e,x
0
i , t)− Φ((ai, a−i);x0e,x0i , t0). (12)
Equation (12) implies that G0 is an exact potential game.
D. Spatial Adaptive Play
Given the fact that our PEG can be formulated as a poten-
tial game, we can now compute a pure Nash equilibrium by
utilizing any iterative learning algorithm for potential games.
The algorithm we will utilize, SAP, is one that is guaranteed
to converge to a nearly efficient pure Nash equilibrium which
yields almost but not the highest total capture utility [20]. In
particular, SAP is suitable for multi-agent target assignment
problems with relatively a small number of players whereas
for a large number of players, one can utilize instead the
Selective Spatial Adaptive Play algorithm [20].
We will denote by ψ the update law (based on SAP) of the
evader assignment profile of the pursuers. The pseudocode
for SAP is provided in Algorithm 1, whose main steps are
discussed next. At every simulation step, a random pursuer
Pi is selected. Thereafter, Pi computes all the hypothetical
utilities he could obtain by selecting every action in his cur-
rent action profile Ai and store the results in a set Si (Line 3).
The goal of Line 5 is to obtain probability distribution over
the action profile Ai. Based on this probability distribution,
the pursuer will choose his next action (Line 6). This can be
achieved by using the following equation:
σ(x) =
eτ
−1x∑|x|
k=1 e
τ−1xk
, (13)
where τ is a parameter for the randomization level that
prevents the pursuer from stagnating in local maxima during
the early phase of the game.
E. Dynamic Evader Assignment
When game-theoretic learning algorithms, such as SAP,
are used to solve potential games, there is an implicit
assumption that the game is static, meaning that the states
and utilities of the players are time-invariant; with this
Algorithm 1 Spatial Adaptive Play: ψ
Input: Ai, a−i,xe,xi, t
Output: ai
1: Si ← ∅
2: for a′i ∈ Ai do
3: Si = Si ∪ {UPi((a′i, a−i);xe,xi, t)}
4: end for
5: pi = σ(Si)
6: ai ← RandSample(Ai; pi)
7: return ai
assumption it is guaranteed that the learning algorithm will
converge to a Nash equilibrium. The stationary assumption
is, however, not practical in our pursuit-evasion game for
a number of reasons. First, it is practically infeasible for
the agents to run hundreds or thousands of negotiation
protocols fast enough until the evader moves to a differ-
ent location. Second, the evader’s state and utility rapidly
change with time in continuous time, and this change will
not be reflected in the negotiations if the game is treated
as a static one. Third, even if the pursuers successfully
agree upon an optimal assignment for game G0 at time
t = 0, this assignment may no longer be the optimal
solution for the following games Gt for t > 0 where
Gt := 〈P, {Ai(t), UPi(a(t);xe(t),xi(t), t)}i∈IP 〉. One way
to overcome this issue is, albeit not wise, to stop the clock
and let the pursuers re-negotiate from the beginning to update
their joint assignment periodically. This method, however,
will obviously cause a significant amount of computation
burden.
Instead, we will utilize the so-called dynamic evader
assignment method [25], whose main steps are summarized
in Algorithm 2. Herein, the negotiation process takes place
on-the-fly while the pursuers conduct their most current
assignment. In Line 5, every pursuer selects a random action
at t = 0 (either follow or stay since there is only one evader
in this game). Thereafter, at every time step, one pursuer
is randomly selected (Line 8) and updates his action using
the SAP update law (Line 11), while the others continue to
conduct their past assignments (Line 12). By utilizing this
method, we will be able to not only reduce the computational
burden of each pursuer but also enable the pursuers to
converge to a near-optimal assignment a(t) for Gt.
IV. NUMERICAL SIMULATIONS
In this section, we present numerical simulation results
obtained with the application of the SAP-based dynamic
evader assignment algorithm (Algorithm 2) for the solution
of the pursuit-evasion game (Problem 1) and compare these
results with those obtained by executing Algorithm 3 which
yields a benchmark solution to our problem. Algorithm 3 is a
centralized ad-hoc algorithm which solves the pursuer-evader
assignment problem in the following way: on behalf of the
individual pursuers, a central server will, by updating the
active pursuer-evader assignment at each time step until the
Algorithm 2 SAP-based dynamic evader assignment
Input: P, E , ψ, tf , δt
Output: Dynamic pursuer-evader assignment
1: while t ≤ tf do
2: if t = 0 then
3: for i ∈ P do
4: Ai(t0)← Update action profile
5: ai(t0)← RandSample(Ai(t0))
6: end for
7: else
8: i← RandSample(P)
9: xe(t),xi(t)← Update player states
10: Ai(t)← Update action profile
11: ai(t) = ψ(Ai(t), a−i(t− δt);xe(t),xi(t), t)
12: a−i(t)← a−i(t− δt)
13: end if
14: end while
evader is captured or the final time tf has elapsed, collect the
time metric of every pursuer (Line 4), select the pursuer with
the smallest time metric (Line 6), and order him to chase the
evader while the other pursuers remain still (Line 8 - Line 9).
To that end, the central server must know the state of every
pursuer as well as the state of the evader.
Algorithm 3 Centralized pursuer-evader assignment
Input: P, E , φ, t, tf
Output: a(t)
1: xe(t),xi(t)← Update player states
2: T ← ∅
3: for i ∈ IP do
4: T = T ∪ {φ(xe(t),xi(t))}
5: end for
6: i← arg min T
7: if T (i) ≤ tf then
8: ai(t)← E
9: a−i(t)← ∅
10: end if
In our simulations, we assume that there always exists
at least one pursuer whose maximum speed is greater than
that of the evader, which we refer to as the super pursuer.
We assume the existence of the super pursuer in order to
guarantee that the team of pursuers committed to employ
the pure pursuit strategy will have good chances to capture
the evader at some time t ≤ tf . As we have mentioned,
the focus of the paper is on the high-level pursuer-target
assignment problem (Problem 1) rather than the low-level
pursuit problem. Indeed, capture of a faster evader may still
be possible in the latter case but our interest here is to
generate a significant number of scenarios with successful
capture of the evader by at least one pursuer in order
to assess the proposed game-theoretic solution in contrast
with the centralized execution of the relay pursuit strategy
proposed in [1], in which an assumption that ensures that
the evader will always be captured by the pursuer is also
made. Furthermore, since the game is simulated in discrete
time (although the equations of motion of the pursuers are
described in continuous time), we will play a turn-based
simulation in which the evader takes an action (evasion) first
and then the pursuers will take actions accordingly. If the
actions of any pursuer lead him to enter the capture zone of
the evader at time t ≤ tf , then the game will be terminated
(successful capture of the evader).
Fig. 1. Initial configuration of the PEG (N = 10)
On top of the scenario using the centralized solution
Algorithm 3, we will consider three additional scenarios
which are based on our decentralized solution with sampling
period δt ∈ {0.1, 0.01, 0.001}. These scenarios allow us
to examine how the choice of the sampling period affects
the performance of our SAP-based dynamic assignment
algorithm during the game. The common parameters used
in all of the three decentralized scenarios as well as the
centralized scenario are: N = 10, tf = 30, x0i ∈ [0, 20], x0e ∈
[8, 12], vi = 1 ∀i ∈ [1, 9]d, v10 = 2, ve = 0.9,  = 0.1, and
τ = 10/η2 where η = t/δt. In summary, the game comprises
of 10 pursuers and one evader, and the 10th pursuer P10
is the super pursuer (as well as the fastest player in the
game) whose maximum speed v10 = 2, whereas vi = 1 for
i ∈ [1, 9]d. Furthermore, the maximum speed of the evader
ve = 0.9. The initial configuration of the players is shown in
Figure 1; therein, P10 is depicted as a yellow circle, the other
pursuers as blue circles, and the evader as a red diamond.
Figure 2 clearly shows that, for the simulations based on
Algorithm 2, the smaller δt we pick, the more similar the
pursuers’ trajectories will look like with those obtained with
the execution of the centralized approach. In other words,
the pursuers tend to adapt to the relay pursuit strategy more
quickly with small δt. This is demonstrated in Figure 2(b)
where we can compare the speed of convergence in each sce-
nario. Conversely, if convergence is too slow, many pursuers
will stay active in the early phase and end up wasting their
resources (such as fuel or energy). Table I shows the total
(a) Centralized, δt = 0.1 (b) Decentralized, δt = 0.1
(c) Decentralized, δt = 0.01 (d) Decentralized, δt = 0.001
Fig. 2. Pursuit-evasion trajectories of pursuers and evaders
sum of the time during which each pursuer was active (all
the numerical values in this table are averaged data from 102
simulation runs). Lastly, note that, although P10 is the super
pursuer herein, he is not the only pursuer who captures the
evader; we occasionally observe in some simulations that a
pursuer different from P10 who is located in the vicinity of
the evader captures him while P10 remains still.
All the simulation data presented herein show that, for
a class of PEGs involving multiple pursuers and a single
evader, individually selfish action by the pursuers guided by
a game-theoretic learning algorithm (negotiation protocol)
naturally converge to a joint strategy which is equivalent
to the relay pursuit strategy (the latter is executed in an
ad-hoc centralized way that yields the benchmark solution
to the game). Therein, despite acting selfishly, the pursuers
end up yielding the opportunity of capturing the evader to
the pursuer that can capture the evader with the shortest
amount of time so that the pursuers as a team can obtain the
maximized capture utility while minimizing the total time of
capture.
TABLE I
SUM OF INDIVIDUAL PURSUER’S ACTIVE TIME UNTIL CAPTURE OF
EVADER (tf = 30)
Centralized Decentralized
δt N = 20 N = 40 N = 20 N = 40
0.1 4.6000 4.8000 55.5900 116.4590
0.01 4.5700 4.6900 11.6580 39.0082
0.001 4.5580 4.6700 5.2088 7.9598
(a) Decentralized, δt = 0.1 (b) Decentralized, δt = 0.01 (c) Decentralized, δt = 0.001
Fig. 3. Individual utilities of pursuers versus time
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have presented a decentralized approach
to the pursuer-evader assignment problem that arises in
pursuit-evasion games involving multiple pursuers and a sin-
gle evader. In our approach, which relies on non-cooperative
game theory, all the pursuers are assumed to be rational
decision makers who try to maximize their own utilities
(conditional on decisions of their teammates). By designing
the utilities such that the pursuer-evader game can put under
the umbrella of potential games, some interesting pursuers’
behaviors emerge. In particular, the selfish pursuers end
up agreeing upon a relay pursuit strategy by executing a
decentralized learning algorithm known as spatial adaptive
play. In our future work, we will consider an extension of
our proposed approach to multiple-pursuer multiple-evader
PEGs. We will also consider problems with incomplete
information in which the evader can adopt more advanced
and sophisticated evasion strategies.
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